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THE LAW RELATING TO OIL
AND GAS IN WYOMINGt
EUGENE 0. KUNTZ*
According to current expert and non-expert opinion, Wyoming
has excellent prospects of becoming one of the great oil and gas pro-
ducing states of the Union. If the pattern of production follows that
established in other states, the volume of oil and gas produced will be
accompanied by a corresponding volume of litigation and resulting
legal problems which cannot be answered from existing local authority.
When confronted with the same situation in the past, other states
have looked to traditional property law for analogy and guidance,
seeking adso to maintain a measure of consistency with established
concepts. While the fixed rules of property law may have provided a
skeleton upon which to build, it has been necessary to depart from
them occasionally in order to meet the practical requirements of the oil
industry, and thus a body of legal concepts has been assembled which
is peculiar in its application to oil and gas. The development of the
field, while not entirely orderly, has been a credit to the bench and bar
of those states where early oil and gas production was also productive
of novel legal problems.
Among the various states, however, the approach to the problems
in the field has by no means been uniform, with the result that many
conflicts exist among prevailing fundamental theories. If Wyoming
develops into a great producing area, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
will find itself in the peculiarly advantageous position of having the
abundant experience of other states at its disposal, and may find it
possible to avoid the embarrassing contradictions found in other
jurisdictions where decisions were pioneer in character. It should be
possible to do what the Wyoming Supreme Court has already ex-
hibited a tendency to do, and that is to adopt no ready-made, com-
prehensive accumulation of decisions from another state, but to accept
only those parts which will round out a body of law containing certain
basic concepts for purposes of stability, yet having sufficient flexibility
to meet the demands of practical considerations as technology and
t Reprinted with permission from 3 Wyoming Law Journal 107 (Spring, 1949). This arti-
cle is one of the most widely read and widely cited of Professor Kuntz's writings. We are pleased
to be able to reprint it here as a part of the Eugene 0. Kuntz Dedication Issue.-Ed.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; A.B., LL.B., Baylor University;
LL.M., Harvard University. Admitted to practice in Texas, 1938.
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business methods in the field progress, and from which problems as
yet unforeseen may be treated with a minimum of difficulty and con-
tradiction.
While the absence of local authority in the field of oil and gas
may be of advantage to the judiciary, it is by no means an advantage
to the practicing attorney confronted with a problem in the field.
Because theories vary so widely among other states, he can find no
safety in unqualified generalization. Further, the atmosphere of ur-
gency which surrounds oil and gas activity seldom permits exhaustive
research and has also served to accelerate the legal evolutionary pro-
cess in other states, so that the general practicing attorney has a dif-
ficult task in distinguishing the obsolescent from the evanescent con-
cepts.
It is with these thoughts in mind that this, the first of a series of
articles, is submitted, with the view of attempting to describe the pat-
tern of Wyoming law and of respectfully suggesting a pattern where
none is indicated.
I.
THE NATURE OF OIL AND GAS
The first problem encountered in the petroleum field concerns the
nature of oil and gas, i.e., whether or not they are considered to be
"minerals" as the term is commonly used, and what character of
ownership is possible in oil and gas so long as they remain in the earth.
Considering the first aspect of the problem, oil and gas are considered
to be minerals in Wyoming when they are specifically mentioned in the
grant or reservation, and as such they are part of the mineral estate
capable of being severed from the surface estate.'
Although oil and gas may be considered to be minerals for other
purposes, still a vexing problem arises when a grant or reservation is
made in which the word "minerals" alone is used and no mention is
made of oil and gas. It is a question of extreme importance to the title
examiner, particularly if the grant or reservation is remote in point of
time. The remoteness in time may make the problem of construction
or correction a more difficult one, and at the same time extends no
comfort to the examiner in the light of the law relating to adverse pos-
session of minerals. On the point of whether or not a reservation of
"minerals" reserves oil and gas (or a similar grant conveys them) there
is no direct Wyoming authority and the decisions in other states pre-
Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 179 P. (2d) 773 (Wyo. 1947); Mineral Severance in
Wyoming, 2 Wyo. L.J. 62 (1948).
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sent a multiple choice. The choices range from an arbitrary holding
that oil and gas are not included in the term "minerals" to an arbi-
trary holding to the contrary, with variations in between.
In Pennsylvania, the question was presented at an early date in
the case of Dunham and Shortt v. Kirkpatrick, 2 and a conclusion was
reached that a reservation of all minerals3 did not include petroleum.
This result was predicated upon the proposition that although petro-
leum is a mineral in the broad sense by general definition, if such a
broad meaning of "minerals" be employed, then all inorganic sub-
stances, including water, sand, clay, etc. would be covered and the re-
servation would be as broad as the grant and therefore void. Instead
of relying upon inflexible definitions which vary in breadth and
character according to the source of the definition, the court con-
sidered that the term "minerals" should be given the meaning to it by
all mankind, i.e. its meaning in common usage. In that day and time,
it was not difficult for the court to arrive at the conclusion that the
"mass of mankind" would not consider petroleum as being embraced
within the term "mineral." The court was purporting to apply an in-
tention test and, in construing the language of the instrument, assumed
that the parties used the term "minerals" as the "mass of mankind"
would use it. In a subsequent decision, the court followed the Dunham
case and held that gas was not a "mineral" within the meaning of a
reservation using that term." Although the Dunham case presents a
rule of construction based upon intention, the Pennsylvania court has
accepted it as a settled and arbitrary rule of property law to the effect
that petroleum is not a "mineral" within the meaning of the term as
used in reservations and grants, and refuses to upset it as so construed
or to apply its rule of intention in the light of what the "mass of
mankind" would consider to be mineral in modern grants.
The rule as so crystalized was applied with absurd results in the
case of Preston v. South Penn Oil Co. I There, the Aetna Oil Company
purchased the land in question in 1864 and drilled for oil without suc-
cess. In 1876 it conveyed the land, "excepting and reserving thereout,
unto the Aetna Oil Company, all mineral and mining rights and the in-
cidents thereto whatever." Because there "was no evidence at the trial
to show that the parties to the deed intended the word 'mineral' to in-
clude petroleum or gas, or that the word had acquired a meaning in
2 101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882).
excepting and reserving all timber suitable for sawing; also all minerals; also the
right to take off such timber and minerals."
Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 Atl. 832 (1906).
238 Pa. 301, 86 Ati. 203 (1913).
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conveyancing to include them," it was decided that petroleum was not
reserved, on the basis of the settled rule of property law announced in
the Dunham case. This result appears to be absurd because, from the
history of the land, together with the fact that the reserving party was
an oil company, which had used the land for purposes of exploring for
oil and which would presumably be primarily interested in oil and its
prospective discovery and production, it would seem that the language
of the instrument with the attending circumstances would clearly in-
dicate that the parties were thinking in terms of petroleum and there-
fore did intend to reserve it from the grant.
Even though it considers oil and gas to be minerals for other pur-
poses, 6 the Pennsylvania court, as indicated, has consistently held that
oil and gas are not minerals within the meaning of the term as used in
instruments of conveyance, unless there is evidence showing a "clear
intention" to include them. That the showing of intention must be a
strong one is evident from the Preston case.
The so-called "Pennsylvania Rule" finds some support but varia-
tion in Ohio. There, in the early case of Detlor v. Holland,7 the court
said: "Do the words 'other valuable minerals' include petroleum oil?
The deed of conveyance was made in February, 1890, and it must be
construed in the light of the oil developments as they then existed in
the vicinity of the land .... Oil was then produced in small quantities
within from 10 to 20 miles of the lands, but there is nothing to show
that the parties to the conveyance had any knowledge thereof." Relying
upon the foregoing proposition, together with the fact that the terms
of the grant applied peculiarly to solid minerals,8 as well as reliance
upon the Dunham case, the court held that a grant of "other valuable
minerals" did not convey the oil and gas. In Ohio, then, oil and gas
would or would not be included in a grant or reservation of the miner-
als, depending upon intention as derived from the instrument and
from surrounding circumstances at the time and place of the grant,
which would leave the question an open one in each case.
A recent announcement of a result like that-in the Dunham and
Detlor cases is contained in a case from Arkansas where the court was
called upon to construe the recitals of instruments executed in 1892
and 1893. 9 The court concluded that as to modern conveyances, the re-
6 Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 116 At. 50 (1922).
57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N.E. 690 (1898).
"... of mining and removing such coal, ore, or other minerals .... with the right to
the use of so much of the surface as may be necessary for pits, shafts, platforms, drains,
railroads, switches, side tracks, etc., to facilitate the mining and removal of such coal, ore, or
other minerals, and no more."
I Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S. W. (2d) 557 (1941).
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servation of "minerals" effectively reserves the oil and gas."0 As to
conveyances remote in point of time, however, the court took the posi-
tion that "a contemporaneous construction is best and most powerful
in law." The court quoted from the 1887 edition of Devlin on Deeds
to the effect that petroleum was not included in a reservation of all
minerals, and after reference to other decisions, it said "Although
there were court decisions holding oil and gas to be minerals, such was
not the general construction; and this was particularly true in a coun-
try where oil and gas were not given the slightest commercial consid-
eration in connection with land values," finally holding that an 1892
and 1893 reservation "reserving all coal and mineral deposits in and
upon said lands" did not reserve oil and gas.
In Indiana, the use of the word "minerals" without further
definition in a conveyance creates an ambiguity which would permit
the use of parol evidence to arrive at the intention of the parties at the
time and place of the grant."
From the original position taken in the Dunham case, several
variations have evolved: (1) that oil and gas arbitrarily are not included
in the term "minerals" unless a contrary intention is clearly shown, (2)
that the intention of the parties controls as arrived at from facts and
circumstances attending the grant, (3) that the construction given the
instrument must be a contemporaneous one with emphasis upon the
contemporaneous legal construction, and (4) that the unexplained use
of the term "minerals" creates an ambiguity.
The line of authorities considered as being contrary to the cases
just mentioned has its origin in the Tennessee case of Murray v.
Allard.'2 In that case, the court came to a conclusion contrary to the
result reached in the Dunham case and marked the line of departure
between the two views. The conclusion that oil and gas are minerals
was reached entirely on the basis of the definition of the term "miner-
als" to "be determined from dictionaries and other similar sources,"
and, as to the question of the intention of the parties, the court said
that the bulk of mankind would consider oil and gas to be minerals.
The Tennessee case has the greatest numerical following among
the other states and hence has become known as the "majority rule."
Implicit in the Murray holding and expressed in many of the cases
following it, is the qualification that, if there is an evident intention to
restrict the meaning of "minerals" so as not to include oil and gas,
10 Citing Sheppard v. Zeppa, 199 Ark. 1, 133 S. W. (2d) 860 (1939).
" Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. A. 236, 56 N. E. (2d) 672 (1944), rehearing
denied, 57 N. E. (2d) 598 (1944).
,, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (1897).
[Vol. 34:28
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they will not be included.' 3 Among the cases following the Murray
case the results vary from an arbitrary holding that "minerals" include
oil and gas' 4 through equivocal conclusions, where an intention to in-
clude oil and gas was found to further support the conclusion, 5 to the
view that "minerals" prima facie includes oil and gas, to be overcome
by contrary intentions drawn from the context of the instrument,' 6 as
by application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis.' 7
Although the results in the cases in other states vary from one ex-
treme to the other, there is a common thread running through them
all. In each instance, except where a "settled rule of property law"
was followed, the court purported to arrive at the intention of the par-
ties. That the intention test as applied is completely unsatisfactory is
demonstrated by the variety of results which flow from it. Further,
such a test is completely without value for use in the future in deter-
mining the character of substances which remain unknown or are pre-
sently considered to have no intrinsic value.
The contradiction and conflict between the cases on the point
arise from the very fact that the courts are seeking to give effect to an
intention to include or exclude a specific substance, when, as a matter
3 The following cases are representative, and not an exhaustive list of authoritie."
Kansas: Roth v. Huser, 147 Kan. 433, 76 P. (2d) 871 (1938).
Virginia: Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 166 Va. 524, 186 S. E. 20 (1936).
Michigan: Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N. W. 818 (1909).
Oklahoma: Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 Pac. 468 (1917); Crain v.
Pure Oil Co., 25 F. (2d) 824 (C.C.A. 8th 1928).
West Virginia: Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307 (1908); Horse Creek
Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S. E. 26 (1918); Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94
W. Va. 475, 119 S. E. 297 (1923); Norman v. Lewis, 100 W. Va. 429, 130 S. E. 913 (1926); Prin-
dle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48, 178 S. E. 513 (1935); Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S. E.
360 (1937).
Kentucky: (In spite of an early tendency to the contrary in McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ken-
tucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S. W. 314 (1909) and Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215
S. W. 81 (1919), Kentucky's position, through strict application of former rules of construction,
now approximates that in the Murray case.) Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 303 Ky. 629, 198
S. W. (2d) 497 (1946); Federal Gas, Oil, & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S. W. (2d) 46
(1941); Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S. W. (2d) 13 (1938).
Texas: Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S. W. (2d) 800 (1940);
Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S. W. 296 (1923); Elliott v. Nelson, 113
Tex. 62, 251 S. W. 501 (Comm. of App. 1923); Luse v. Parmer, 221 S. W. 1031 (Civ. App.
1920); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S. W. 1096 (Civ. App. 1919); Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City
Oil, Gas, & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S. W. 737 (1913); cf. Carothers v. Mills, 233 S. W. 155
(Civ. App. 1921) in which the court considered the question of intention of the parties in using
the term "minerals" to be a question for the jury.
W eaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N. W. 818 (1909).
" Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 Pac. 468 (1917).
16 Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S. E. 360 (1937).
" Prindle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48, 178 S. E. 513 (1935).
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of fact, the parties had nothing specific in mind on the matter at all. It
is submitted that an intention test is the proper one, but not as applied
heretofore. The intention sought should be the general intent rather
than any supposed but unexpressed specific intent, and, further, that
general intent should be arrived at, not by defining and re-defining the
terms used, but by considering the purposes of the grant or reservation
in terms of manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing interests.
When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals with-
out qualifying language, it should be reasonably assumed that the par-
ties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate,
leaving the owner of each with definite incidents of ownership enjoy-
able in distinctly different manners. The manner of enjoyment of the
mineral estate is through extraction of valuable substances, and the en-
joyment of the surface is through retention of such substances as are
necessary for the use of the surface, and these respective modes of en-
joyment must considered in arriving at the proper subject matter for
each estate.
Applying this intention, the severance should be construed to
sever from the surface all substances presently valuable in themselves,
apart from the soil, whether their presence is known or not, and all
substances which become valuable through development of the arts
and sciences, and that nothing presently or prospectively valuable as
extracted substances would be intended to be excluded from the
mineral estate.
A limitation upon the mineral estate should be that only those
substances can be removed without compensation which can be
removed without unreasonable injury to the enjoyment of the surface
estate, i.e. without unreasonably interfering with the uses for which
the land is adapted. To this extent, the surface and mineral estates are
not only mutually dominant, but are also mutually servient estates.
The surface estate is burdened with the right of access, and the mineral
estate is burdened with the right of the surface owner to insist that the
surface be left intact and that it not be rendered valueless for the pur-
poses for which it is adapted, by depletion of sub-surface or surface
substances. This limitation upon the mineral estate renders innocuous
the objection raised in the Dunham case that, if all the minerals in the
broad sense be included in the reservation, then the reservation would
be as broad as the grant and therefore void. Further, it does no
violence to the intention of the parties. If the presence of oil and gas is
not suspected, or if their value is not known at the time of the grant, it
is admitted that the parties had no specific intention either to exclude
them or include them. Since there was no specific intention on the
[Vol. 34:28
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
REPRINT: WYOMING LA W JOURNAL
matter, effect should be given to their general intentions, and that was
to sever substances which become valuable only through extraction.
The fact that oil and gas were not substances then considered to be
valuable in themselves bears only upon one aspect of this general in-
tention and not upon the associated intention to sever the fee into two
separate estates, distinct in form and enjoyment.
Since the enjoyment of oil and gas is through extraction, it
should be considered to be within a general grant or reservation of the
minerals. Further, since its retention is not necessary to the enjoyment
of the surface estate, i.e. its removal does not deplete the soil for sur-
face purposes, nor does its extraction destroy the surface nor remove
subjacent support, oil and gas, therefore, should not only be con-
sidered to be within a general mineral grant, but also, in the absence of
demonstrated special circumstances, should be subject to extraction
without compensation to the surface owner. The only interference
with the surface enjoyment is in the exercise of the right of access,
which is not permanently substantial in character and which must exist
by necessity.
A further limitation must be made upon the general proposition
set out. Since minerals may be severed piece-meal, i.e. both as to type
and location, if the language of the instrument indicates a specific in-
tention to do so, then that intention must be given full effect. For ex-
ample, where the purposes of the grant indicate that a specific type of
mineral was intended to be covered, or where there is an enumeration
of certain minerals having characteristics in common followed by
"etc.", or where the description of the rights or removal are suffi-
ciently specific to indicate that only a certain character of mineral was
intended to be covered, then, in such cases, there is a specific intent
present and it is expressed, although perhaps not with the desired clar-
ity. In all other cases, i.e. where no specific intent can be found, the
general intention to sever all substances valuable in themselves should
be given effect.
Aside from the advantage of conforming more closely to the ori-
ginal intention of the parties, this proposed view also has the advan-
tage of certainty without the disadvantage of being unreasoned in its
certainty. In matters of land titles, and most certainly in the field of oil
and gas where heavy expenditures of capital are incident to explora-
tion, development and production, certainty is of the utmost impor-
tance. A rule which requires consideration of the contemporaneous
factual or legal setting would create the impossible situation of requir-
ing the title examiner to inquire into the local folk-lore of the area or
of requiring the examiner to retain a catalogued knowledge of the law
1981]
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as to dates of development. In either event, he could never be confi-
dent of his conclusion.
A supporting policy to be considered is that orderly production
of oil, gas, or other valuable substances should be encouraged and
favored where possible to contribute to the wealth and well-being of
society in general and the community in particular. As petroleum and
petroleum products grow in importance as military supplies, a con-
sideration of national security should also be included in the policy
favoring production. Obviously, the policy favoring production is best
served by a rule which makes title to minerals most certain.
It should be pointed out at this point, also, that the discovery of
new substances valuable in themselves would not serve to "expand the
grant or reservation" but would only serve to make more certain the
specific subject matter of a general grant.
Aside from arriving at a reasonable immediate result, this concept
is sufficiently flexible to be adaptable for use in coping with future
problems. As shown by a review of the authorities, the effort to arrive
at a specific intention concerning a specific substance has led to con-
flicting results in the case of oil and gas, and, unquestionably, will lead
to further confusion and conflict in the future as new valuable sub-
stances are discovered. If some substance, heretofore thought to be
valueless in itself, should suddenly become very valuable by virtue of a
new scientific or technological development, nothing but uncertainty
would confront the courts in determining whether or not it was included
in a general grant of minerals if the conclusion were sought to be
reached through definition or determination of intent to include the
specific substance. On the other hand, the conclusion would be an
easier one if the "manner of enjoyment" test herein submitted were
employed.
Taking the most difficult case possible, assume further that the
new substance, a mineral by scientific definition, is dispersed through
the top-soil of a restricted area of the State, or lies immediately
beneath such top-soil. Under these facts, the removal of the substance
would involve extensive excavation and a destruction of the use of the
land for its surface purposes. How, on the basis of specific intention,
could a court ever feel at ease with a conclusion in either direction? On
the basis of intended enjoyment, however, a solution is not too dif-
ficult. The rights of the surface owner to subjacent support and his
right to the use of the top-soil in its place would have to be respected,
and at the same time, the owner of the mineral fee should have a right
of extraction. Since the right of extraction could only be exercised by
destruction of the surface owner's enjoyment, it could only be accom-
[Vol. 34:28
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plished with compensation for the damages to the surface estate. Such
damages would not be measured by the value of the substance in its
new use, but would be measured by the reduction in value of the land
for its surface use, and this liability would arise because, in such case,
the exercise of a right of access to the mineral would unreasonably in-
terfere with the surface use. Specific mention of the substance,
however, together with the usual provisions for extraction, would
demonstrate a specific intention to make the surface right subject to
the rights of access for purposes of extraction and would not make the
mineral owner accountable for necessary damage flowing therefrom.
A case like the hypothetical one just described arose recently in
Arkansas where the court was called upon to decide whether or not
bauxite was a mineral within the terms of a reservation of "all coal
and mineral deposits in and upon said lands."' 9 With three members
dissenting, the court decided that bauxite was not included within the
reservation because the existence of bauxite in Arkansas was not
generally known in 1892 and 1896, the dates of the contract and the
conveyance, respectively. In addition to such reason, it was observed
that bauxite is generally extracted by the digging of open pits, and that
if the grant to the surface owner were accompanied by a reservation
which would render his estate valueless, the reservation would be as
broad as the grant and void.' 9 (The instrument contained a general
provision for the right to enter and remove the mineral deposits
without accounting for damages.)
The result in the Arkansas case is directly opposite to the result
urged herein under the "manner of enjoyment" test. The court, in its
zeal to protect the surface estate from invasion, conferred upon the
owner of such estate a valuable mineral deposit in addition to his farm
land. As a result of the decision, the surface owner could extract the
bauxite for his own benefit, which is not a traditional form of enjoy-
ment by a surface owner and which could hardly have been intended
by the parties. Under the test herein submitted, the court would have
come to a contrary conclusion, complied with the general intention of
the parties, and reached a result which would have been of some assist-
ance in the determination of the clharacter of future substances. Since
the provision for entry and extraction without accounting for damage
was general in nature, and since bauxite was not specifically mentioned,
J Carson v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S. W. (2d) 97 (1948).
'9 See also the reasoning [in] Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S. W. (2d) 658 (Civ. App. 1947)
(sand and gravel); and in Allen v. Heinatz, 212 S. W. (2d) 987 (Civ. App. 1948) (limestone). Re
minerals recoverable only by open pit mining, see Ann: 1 A. L. R. (2d) 787.
1981]
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the right of the owner of the mineral estate to extract the mineral by
open pit mining would be subject to the right of the surface owner to
compensation for the loss of his land for farming purposes. If the
mineral is of commercial value, this limitation to the right of extrac-
tion would not be prohibitive. Whether or not a specific mention of
bauxite in the provision for entry and extraction without accounting
for damage would be valid need not be decided here since such condi-
tion is not present in the oil and gas problem. It may be observed in
passing, however, that if the court were to determine that such a provi-
sion made the reservation as broad as the grant and therefore void, it
would be more reasonable to hold void the right of entry without com-
pensation rather than to hold void the reservation of the mineral.
Turning to Wyoming authority, no case has been found which
deals directly with the question considered herein,20 and the cases
which fall within the general field are not sufficiently close to the
problem to permit a conclusion to be reached with any confidence.
In Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency,2' the court uses the terms
"minerals" and "mineral fee" as including oil and gas, but in that
case, the reservation expressly included oil and gas.2" Thus, oil and gas
are considered to be minerals in the general sense, and it would not be
inconsistent to hold that oil and gas are included within the general
term "minerals" when used alone, but such conclusion does not neces-
sarily follow.
In Chittim v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Co.,23 the court
quoted with approval two definitions of "mineral" in arriving at the
conclusion that bentonite is a mineral. Those definitions are: ".... any
form of earth, rock, or metal of greater value while in place than the
20 An extremely strange factual situation is presented in Denver Joint Stock Land Bank
of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P. (2d) 842 (1942). There, the problem is present in the
abstract, but it was not involved in the particular case. The exact language of all instruments is
not shown because not material to the decision, but apparently "A", a remote grantor, con-
veyed a section of land and reserved all coal and other minerals with exclusive right to prospect
for such mineral. There appeared in the record no later conveyance of the minerals by "A". A
subsequent grantee, "B", conveyed the surface and a non-participating royalty interest, reserv-
ing "all minerals, oil and gas in, upon, or underlying said lands". A statement in the record in-
dicated that an oil and gas lease had been given on the premises by one claiming under "B" and
that there was production. "A" was not a party to the suit and his rights were not involved, but
the court was careful to say: "No question as to the ownership of mineral rights prior to that
deed is raised herein." The deed referred to was the conveyance by "B."
, 179 P. (2d) 773 (Wyo. 1949).
22 ,,. . reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns, all minerals, mineral deposits,
mineral oil and natural gases of every kind and nature contained in or upon said lands, the sur-
face of which is hereby conveyed."
"3 60 Wyo. 235, 149 P. (2d) 142, 146 (1944).
[Vol. 34:28
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enclosing country or superficial soil;'2 4 and "The real test seems to be
the character of the deposit as occurring independently of the mere
soil, valuable in itself for commercial purposes, that is, close enough
to market to have value." '25 Again, it is possible to say that oil and gas
are minerals under such definitions, yet it would not be inconsistent to
add the words "at the time of the grant" to each definition, if the
issue arose squarely between grantor and grantee. It is of some signifi-
cance, however, that the term "minerals" was not defined in this opi-
nion by scientific definition, nor by reference to other restrictive
definitions which look to physical characteristics, but in terms of the
intrinsic value of the substance. This type of definition lends itself
naturally to the "manner of enjoyment" test presented herein.
It is entirely possible, however, that when an instrument between
private parties is being construed, the court may consider that the
problem is presented in a different medium and may be lured into the
position of placing emphasis upon a rule of construction which seeks
an intention to include specific substances. If this is done, the court
will be adopting a position from which it can only move in specific
cases with difficulty, and it will be adopting a questionable and short-
sighted attitude which the experience in other states has demonstrated
to be more productive of grief than justice.
14 Morrison, Mining Rights, 250 (16th ed. 1936).
2 Lindley, Mines and Mineral Lands, 156 (2d ed. 1914).
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